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A summer of  tough love 
Political seasons in the EU used to 
peak in March, June, October and 
December. These are the dates when 
more or less regular Summits take 
place and common decisions are 
expected to be finalised. June 2011, 
however, has been hardly conclusive 
– although the appointment of 
Christine Lagarde at the head of the 
IMF has closed an embarrassing and 
potentially dangerous gap while 
reassuring those who feared an anti-
European shift at a highly sensitive 
time.  
On the one hand, meetings of the 
European Council have become ever 
more frequent. As a result, major 
decisions are taken in stages and 
through successive instalments, so to 
speak. The process is phased in 
m o r e  g r a d u a l l y ,  a n d  t h e 
brinkmanship and drama of all-
nighters in the Justus Lipsius 
building - the last one took place on 
9 May 2010 over the first package 
for Greece - have now become less 
likely or even necessary.  
On the other hand, the sense of 
urgency and the pressure to make 
momentous choices are surely not 
gone. The European Council of 23-
24 June did agree on a number of 
important issues and laid the ground 
for further decisions to be 
implemented in the weeks to come. 
For their part, the Member States 
(starting, but not stopping, with 
Greece) are expected to deliver on 
their commitments regarding 
budgetary adjustments and domestic 
reforms as articulated in the 
European Semester.  
All of these are going be painful for 
many but also indispensable to 
weather the current crisis and 
reassure partners, inside and outside 
the euro zone.  And political leaders 
in the capitals will have to take the 
heat  – on top of the usual summer 
peaks – for measures that are as 
unpopular as they are necessary. 
Europe needs to move on from the 
current lethal combination of bailout 
fatigue and austerity fatigue.  
For its part, the Commission has just 
delivered its draft proposal for the 
Multi-Annual Financial Framework 
(MFF), which will constitute the 
basis for a EU-wide debate that is 
due to start right away and is likely 
to last for at least one year. This 
issue of BEPA Monthly Brief 
intends to contribute to this debate 
by addressing how the EU does 
and/or should spend its money, and 
why – in full awareness that this is 
just a starting shot. Indeed, ce n'est 
qu'un début …  
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Especially after the launch by the Commission of 
its draft proposal for the Multi-Annual Financial 
framework (MFF), the EU enters a debate on 
how its budget could and should be shaped in 
the future to serve its citizens. Such debate will 
last many months and will involve a number of 
key stakeholders like the European Parliament 
and the Member States. Just looking at the 
budget (or the costs side) without considering 
the benefits common EU policies bring risks 
leading to biased and, above all, sub-optimal 
trade-offs.  
To help prevent this, BEPA has undertaken an 
investigation into how and where EU actions, 
policies, and in particular expenditure can add 
value to its citizens and Member States – above 
and beyond, that is, the crude operating costs 
involved. It has done so only through a limited 
number of examples of common policies – but 
one which already paints a revealing picture. This 
research focuses primarily on the macro impact 
of broad policy schemes and complements the 
staff working document prepared by the 
Secretariat-General; now attached to the 
Commission’s proposals for the MFF. 
To start with, it is worth reminding that the 
EU budget amounts to less than 1% of the 
Union’s gross national income (GNI), i.e. a small 
fraction of government spending at national 
level, which ranges – among the 27 – from 30% 
to over 50% of GNI.  
Nonetheless, testing the added value of 
EU spending is a useful exercise that enhances 
the accountability of institutions to citizens 
and Member States alike. As President Barroso 
outlined in his letter to the President of the 
European Parliament of 26 November 2010, 
European added value is “a key test to justify 
spending at the EU […]. The Commission will 
also fully take into account the European 
added value as well as the synergies between 
the EU and national budgets for specific 
policies, and the corresponding savings, in its 
proposals on the next Multiannual Financial 
Framework”. 
Over the years, some Member States have used 
the notion of “fair return” (juste retour) as a 
political argument, especially when negotiating 
their contributions to the EU budget. In 
accounting terms, however, the notion is 
questionable. Researchers have demonstrated 
why and how such calculations lack rigour and 
are at times even meaningless. More 
fundamentally, they have pointed out that 
European integration is not a zero-sum game in 
which amounts “paid” or “received” by Member 
States net out – especially given the specific 
value that integration creates.  
Furthermore, it is highly debatable whether 
policies that have a non-economic goal (for 
instance, redistribution, environmental 
protection, security, freedom of movement) 
should be assessed solely in terms of economic 
cost/benefit analysis. President Barroso’s letter 
stressed i.a. that “the value added of a political 
project cannot be reduced to a balance sheet”. 
Large as they may seem, the payments made by 
the “net contributor” Member States generally 
amount to less than 0.5% of their GNI. In 2000–
9, the one with the largest net contribution as a 
share of its economy was the Netherlands’: it 
amounted to 0.40% of GNI. The next largest 
“net contributors” (Sweden, Denmark, 
Luxembourg) reached 0.31/0.34% of their 
respective GNIs. 
Such sums are dwarfed by the benefits of the EU 
to Member States. Among the 15 examples of 
EU added value identified and assessed by 
BEPA, several yield larger benefits individually 
than the total costs of the EU budget. For 
instance, evaluations by various research and 
academic organizations suggest that the added 
value of the Single Market alone is at least 2.15% 
of GDP; that of competition policy 3.2%; the 
liberalisation of air travel 4%; and the euro 10% 
of GDP. Overall, it is undeniable that the 
benefits of the Union to the Member States far 
outweigh the material costs of the EU budget. 
 
1 Europe’s added value: changing the discourse 
By Baudouin Regout* 
* Baudouin Regout is Adviser in the Analysis Team of BEPA 
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For example(s) 
If one delves more deeply, the following 
examples highlight three types of impact:   
• key policies at the core of a Europe-wide 
open, free, competitive and innovative single 
market: single market policies, trade policy, 
competition policy, enlargement, the euro, 
freedom to work across Europe, and research 
and innovation policies. If one assumes that 
adding up the individual effects of these 
policies is representative of their combined 
impact, their total added value is in the region 
of 10–20% of GDP; 
• sectoral policies, such as airline travel and air 
traffic management, telecommunications and 
energy. Adding up the individual effects of 
deregulation and network interconnection 
policies in these sectors would gives an 
estimated added value of 5% of GDP; 
• policies with regional or local impact: these 
include cohesion policies as well as the sheer 
incidence of European institutions on 
regional economies. For instance, Objective 1 
funds boosted the growth of convergence 
regions by 12% from 1995 to 2006; and the 
European institutions contribute 13% to the 
economy of the Brussels region. 
While data on the impact on labour markets is 
incomplete, the cumulative effect of these 
selected examples amounts to at least 12 million 
extra jobs, or about 5% of EU-27 employment.  
Needless to say, all these common policies also 
bring huge non-economic benefits – such as 
increased personal freedom across Europe, 
stronger solidarity between European regions, 
more effective action against climate change, 
bigger clout in global negotiations and, last but 
not least, a more peaceful and secure Europe. 
Combined with some country-specific 
information (such as net contributions to the 
EU budget), these examples can help convey a 
first rough picture of not only the nominal costs 
but also the real benefits of EU policies.  
Net indirect benefits for some net 
contributors 
Germany, to start with, is a leading exporter in 
and to Europe, with more than 85% surplus 
balance realised within the single market. Every 
fourth job in Germany is dependent on exports. 
The positive effect of the euro, in particular, on 
the German economy has also been remarkable. 
German exports to the euro zone grew 
impressively over the years thanks to that: 
3% per annum from 1990 to 1998, 6.5% from 
1999 to 2003, and 9% from 2004 to 2007. 
Often neglected are also the benefits that the UK 
derives via the central role that the City of 
London plays across Europe, especially in 
wholesale banking and financial markets. Such a 
role is greatly facilitated by EU regulations on 
free trade of services and the European passport, 
i.e. the principles of mutual recognition – which 
allows financial services operators legally 
established in one Member State to provide their 
services in other ones without further 
authorisation requirements. London’s financial 
sector and exports make a large contributor to 
the UK’s balance of payments: trade in services 
with EU-27, in particular, has been in surplus for 
five of the last six years, growing strongly to 
record a net surplus of £ 9.2 billion in 2009. On 
top of that, the City employs more than 
300 000 people in Greater London. 
For its part, the Netherlands benefits 
significantly from the EU’s enlarged single 
market in two ways. First, Dutch exports 
represent 84% of its GDP (2008), more than 
80% of which is directed towards European 
countries. The Dutch Central Plan Bureau 
estimated the contribution of the Single Market 
in the range of 4 to 6% of GDP (2008), equalling 
1500 to 2200 EUR per inhabitant per year. 
Second, the Port of Rotterdam prides itself to be 
the gateway to Europe, and indeed has seen its 
throughput increase by 50% since the 
introduction of the Single Market in 1992. In 
2010 the economic importance of the Port of 
Rotterdam can be expressed in (in)direct added 
value of 22.2 billion EUR (3.3% of GDP) and 
(in)direct employment for 145 000 people.  
These selected examples show how much value 
the EU already adds to all its citizens and 
Member States – and how much more can come 
in the future. The fresh debate on the MFF is a 
perfect opportunity to explore new ideas and 
new trade-offs.  
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The debate on the EU budget beyond 2013 is now 
beginning in earnest. Despite the current budget’s 
well-documented, much-bemoaned and readily-
apparent shortcomings (and in apparent 
obliviousness to the consequences of the 
economic, financial and debt crisis), few experts 
expect the kind of major refurbishment that might 
be called for at this stage. Even after years of verbal 
pledges to make Europe a “dynamic knowledge-
based economy” and to build an “Innovation 
Union”, it looks as if – once again – vested 
interests will triumph and organised opposition will 
combat even the most modest efforts to modernise 
budgetary priorities. In many ways, the budget 
exemplifies everything that is wrong with Europe – 
a keen awareness of the need to change, on the one 
hand, versus the stubborn and illogical allegiance to 
the status quo, on the other. 
In the absence of any expectation that budget 
priorities will change fundamentally in the next 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), what 
could be some innovations and new approaches 
that would at least mark some progress and 
measure of reform?  
From subsidies to investments 
First, the entire intellectual underpinning of the 
European budget needs to be re-thought and re-
evaluated. In the ideal world, we would move 
from a logic of open-ended subsidies and ill-
defined goals of “redistribution” towards a logic 
of strategic and targeted investments of limited 
duration. This would necessitate two things: 
• firstly, fewer grants and more loans. Loans should 
serve better than grants in incentivising 
recipients to ensure that there will be a proper 
return on investment (ideally, a sustainable 
effect in terms of growth, employment and 
innovation). Some stake in accepting funding 
– as would be the case with a loan because it 
needs to be paid back – would have the 
potential to result in dramatically improved 
business plans, execution of projects and 
impact monitoring – not least because the 
loan-granting entity wants to ensure success, 
as that makes servicing the debt more likely. 
Currently, there are insufficient means to 
reprimand grant recipients who do not deliver 
value and impact; 
• secondly, re-think the practice of letting recipients 
decide how money is spent. While there are 
(nominally) some requirements on how to use 
EU funds, in practice there is too much 
leeway in letting politicians and fonctionnaires at 
Member State level decide on spending 
priorities. The result has been an excessive 
focus on large-scale domestic (pet) building 
projects, which may serve well as vote-getters 
for local politicians but which have hardly 
facilitated structural change, modernised 
economies and provided lasting value in terms 
of employment and growth. 
That needs to change as European citizens and 
taxpayers rightly wonder why some of the largest 
recipients of EU cohesion funds – namely 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal – are the very 
countries they now need to bail out. There are 
limits to “solidarity”, especially when the concept 
is abused and countries stubbornly use the 
money to subsidise the unsustainable. By doing 
so, the budget – and the larger European project 
– will continue to lose credibility.  
From push to pull  
So if local leaders and fonctionnaires should not 
decide unilaterally how to spend the money, who 
should? In general, we need more pull and less push: 
money should go into areas where there is 
genuine and demonstrable demand and where 
other actors – such as the European Investment 
Bank or non-public entities (private companies, 
financial service providers and venture funds) – 
are also prepared to take a stake. They would 
serve as a sort of quality control because they are 
only prepared to channel money into projects that 
they deem fund-worthy and successful over time.  
Many EU-funded projects are not sustainable as 
they are unable to secure other sources of 
2 Reforming the EU budget: if  not now, then when? 
By Ann Mettler* 
* Ann Mettler is executive director of the Lisbon Council. This article was written before the Commission’s proposals on the MFF. 
bepa monthly brief 
June 2011 – Issue 48 
5 
 
funding or become self-sufficient: they simply 
collapse after EU funding is withdrawn. By 
trying to prevent these “white elephant” projects 
from ever getting off the ground, and 
recognising the need to ensure upfront that 
projects are viable, the Commission’s 
DG REGIO is now rightfully pushing the 
concept of “smart specialisation”. In a nutshell, 
it means that regions need to adopt a more 
bottom-up, entrepreneurial and demand-based 
rationale behind projects, rather than the top-
down, publicly funded wish-list of local 
politicians. It’s a subtle but profound shift from 
using public funds to essentially crowd out 
private initiatives to embracing co-creation and 
collaboration between public and private actors. 
In other words, more pull and less push – more 
public-private partnerships and fewer public-
sector solo acts.  
From domestic to European 
The future MFF needs to have more of a pan-
European dimension. It is in the interests of all 
to spend more where “Europe” can make a 
difference, such as cross-border transport, 
energy, and ICT projects. The reason why going 
European in these areas makes sense is twofold: 
• first, it would be more costly to fund these 
projects individually at national level – which 
is not advantageous at any time, but is 
particularly inappropriate now in the midst of 
a financial and debt crisis; 
• second, most Member States by definition are 
more intent on domestically focused spending 
priorities, so it is natural that the EU needs to 
fill this gap and help make the smart energy 
grid, the 21st century broadband infrastructure 
and the Europe-wide sustainable transport 
systems a reality. 
Against this backdrop, the plans for a 
“Connecting Europe Facility” that will provide a 
policy roadmap and accompanying financial 
framework for ambitious Europe-wide projects 
is long overdue. Such a vision for long-term 
investment in strategic areas would not only 
demonstrate policy commitment but also give 
the necessary assurance to private investors (e.g. 
pension funds) of becoming involved in such 
projects. 
From juste retour to own resources 
The current system of juste retour, meaning that 
Member States try to get as much out of the 
budget as they put in, has rendered the EU’s 
financial framework dysfunctional, short-sighted 
and prone to political manipulation. The only 
way to overcome the dependency on national 
contributions to the EU – and lessen the 
exposure to national egotisms that so often stand 
in the way of doing the right thing for the 
common good – is to raise more funds from so-
called “own resources”. To be sure, this is not 
about increasing the total EU budget: it is only 
about raising funds in a manner that is 
commensurate with the challenges ahead, which 
call for more strategic investment in the wider 
European interest. A tax on financial 
transactions and allocating part of the European 
Emission Trading scheme to EU coffers are 
both good proposals. And if the Member States 
spike the proposals for own resources, they 
forgo their right to complain about the 
EU budget.  
From policy to politics  
As is always the case, however, the ultimate test 
of reform will not be the policy, the intellectual 
arguments, the evidence presented – but the 
politics, the down-and-dirty of interest group 
wrangling, the Member States’ ability and 
willingness to act beyond their immediate short-
term interests.  
To be sure, this MFF is about something much 
larger than the actual amount of money, which 
(as we all know) is comparatively small. This 
MFF is about what we as EU want to stand for 
in the 21st century; it is about demonstrating to 
our citizens and our global partners that we 
collectively have the ability to embrace change 
and embody modernisation – and that we are 
prepared to walk the talk of the Europe 2020 
Strategy.  
Europe is at its best when it supports movement 
and mobility, exchange and collaboration, 
renewal and entrepreneurship. These are the 
areas that are in need of financing, and where 
even modest EU disbursements could make a 
profound difference. It is high time to put our 
money where our mouth is.  
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The contribution of 16 European think tanks 
to the Polish, Danish and Cypriot Trio 
Presidency of the EU Council 
This publication provides a thorough overview of 
the prospects of economic growth, aspects of 
economic governance and challenges in the fields 
of security and JLS that the Polish, Danish and 
Cypriot Trio Presidency could face in the next 
eighteen months. In an in-depth study of the 
Trio’s role – both front-stage and back-stage – as 
it develops in the context of the Lisbon Treaty’s 
implementation, each chapter aims to take stock 
of the initiatives adopted in the last eighteen 
months identifying challenges that have emerged 
and formulates concrete short- to medium-term 
proposals for rapid progress in Commission 
policies. In doing so, the authors analyse direct 
and indirect developments on a sector-by-sector 
basis and examines the role of the Presidency in 
shaping inter-institutional relations. 
h t t p : / / w w w . n o t r e - e u r o p e . e u / u p l o a d s /
tx_publication/TGAE2011-web_01.pdf  
Privatisation is no salvation 
While the Greek government is eager to privatise 
public assets, this commentary argues that 
privatisation is a mirage. Solvency and liquidity 
should not be confused. Privatisation cannot 
limit public debt, especially if it has to be done at 
distressed prices. Selling assets can only be a 
short-term solution to help the current 
government reduce the debt service burden. 
Future governments, however, will lose 
important sources of revenues that could 
contribute to an increase in the risk premium of 
longer-term debt or to the reduction of the value 
of existing claims of long-term creditors. 
Although a tempting prescription, large scale 
privatisation has already been tried 
unsuccessfully in Argentina prior to the onset of 
its crisis. The article concludes that due to 
privatisation the return to capital markets might 
be even less plausible. 
http://www.ceps.eu/book/privatisation-no-salvation 
Debt restructuring in the euro area:  
A necessary but manageable evil? 
This article explains measures aimed at providing 
a safety net to the Greek economy. There is a low 
possibility for the government to borrow from 
the market. Moreover, the author points to the 
impossibility of official lending with potential 
voluntary private sector participation (Plan A) 
being successful, since it risks hoarding the debt 
and further deteriorating the political situation. 
However, coercive and pre-emptive, or post-
default restructuring of privately-held Greek 
government debt (Plan B) is necessary because it 
might reduce the size of the sovereign debt. Yet, it 
could lead to the exchange rate collapsing and 
problems with access to capital, liquidity and 
credibility of banks. The report recommends that 
the EU takes decisive action in debt restructuring 
and the strengthening of the Greek banking 
system through stress-testing and recapitalisation. 
http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-
detail/publication/567-debt-restructuring-in-the-euro-
area-a-necessary-but-manageable-evil/ 
The European Security Strategy: 
Reinvigorate, revise or reinvent? 
This paper argues that a strategic discussion on the 
EU’s external action is overdue and that the future 
of the European Security Strategy should be central 
to this discussion. The nature of an eventual new 
strategy, the chosen process for revision and its 
intended effects remain still unclear. The new 
security strategy should fulfil three functions: have 
political appeal and thus a potential to inspire; 
serve as a guideline for daily bureaucratic work; and 
serve as a way of communicating the EU and its 
views to a broad audience (inside and outside the 
EU). The report examines arguments for and 
against revisiting the strategy; points to the 
importance of learning from the past when 
drafting a revised strategy; and assesses three 
options for addressing the current one: 
reinvigoration, revision, or reinvention. 
http://www.ui.se/upl/files/56515.pdf 
3 Think Tank Twitter 
Think Tank Twitter (TTT) aims to provide regular information and updates on what is produced by think tanks and research centres across 
Europe (and beyond) on EU policy issues. As an analogy to the original Twitter, each summary – or tweet – does not exceed 140 words, rather 
than characters. Those who wish to signal new publications for possible inclusion can send them to the email address bepa-think-tank-
twitter@ec.europa.eu 
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Stronger after the crisis – Strategic choices 
for Europe’s way ahead 
This paper argues that Europe is at a crossroads: 
either European leaders succeed in re-energising 
European integration or the EU will no longer 
be relevant to its citizens and will be unable to 
shape their future. The resolution of the euro 
crisis is a sine qua non condition for the future of 
the European project. A reactive approach will 
not suffice: once the debt crisis is contained, the 
EU will need to proactively reignite integration, 
rebuild consensus, and link the leadership 
ambitions of key actors at national and European 
levels. Four potential strategic projects are 
suggested: (1) the completion of an integrated 
internal market; (2) the establishment of a 
common migration and asylum policy; (3) the 
revitalisation of the European social model; (4) 
the establishment of a “Defence Union”. 
h t t p : / / w w w . e p c . e u / d o c u m e n t s / u p l o a d s /
pub_1300_strategy_paper.pdf 
Innovation activities and competitiveness: 
Empirical evidence on the behaviour of firms 
in the new EU Member States and candidate 
countries  
This paper attempts to identify the factors and 
forces influencing the ability of firms from several 
transition economies in Central and East 
European Countries (CEECs) to compete 
effectively in globalised markets and to expand 
their market share. The results indicate that 
competitiveness of firms is enhanced with 
improvements in their cost efficiency, 
productivity of labour, investment and their 
previous business experience while stronger 
competition has a negative impact on it. This 
study concludes that even though competitiveness 
is dynamic, the current behaviour of firms in 
CEECs does not fundamentally differ from the 
transition period. Moreover, despite progress 
achieved in the CEECs, innovation activities can 
enable Croatian firms to also catch up with 
CEECs despite their advanced stage of transition. 
h t t p : / / w w w . c a s e - r e s e a r c h . e u / u p l o a d /
publikacja_plik/33632351_CNSA_2011_424.pdf 
 
 
Death of an institution: The end for Western 
European Union, a future for European 
defence? 
This report reviews the 57-year lifespan of the 
WEU to assess its achievements and legacies. An 
initial post mortem on the WEU’s achievements 
could credit its role in early post-war 
consolidation; its political ambition to construct 
a European security identity and further 
transatlantic relations since the 1980s; and its 
support in cementing common approaches in 
crisis management. However, the EU has proved 
unable to absorb and improve on three aspects 
of the WEU’s legacy: true collective defence 
guarantees of the Modified Brussels Treaty; 
openness towards Turkey and other non-EU 
Allies; and the maintenance of a specialised 
parliamentary assembly for defence and security. 
The post-WEU situation could see new security 
challenges leading to greater defence integration; 
or longer-term security potential better served 
without ‘hard’ military traits. 
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep46.pdf 
Divided we fail: Time for the EU to speak 
with one voice to Belarus 
This report argues that EU attempts to draw 
Belarus closer to the EU have failed. Active 
engagement with the regime has not resulted in 
democratisation nor in a rapprochement with the 
EU, any more than the policy of isolation had. 
This failure is partly due to persistent 
divergences among EU member states and their 
perceptions of Russia’s role in the shared 
neighbourhood. This trend should urgently be 
reversed, since it plays into the hands of the 
regime and pushes Belarus into Moscow's 
sphere. Instead, the EU should speak with one 
voice – through a coalition of the willing – in a 
language that the authorities understand: 
pragmatism. Provided that Minsk frees political 
prisoners, a roadmap for conditional support of 
economic reforms and gradual regime evolution 
could be negotiated. 
http://www.upi-fiia.fi/en/publication/196/ 
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Arrivées et départs 
Le 1er juillet Eric Peters rejoint l’équipe Analysis 
du BEPA en tant que conseiller. Auparavant, il 
était conseiller spécial au sein de la 
Représentation permanente française auprès de 
l’UE. Lauren O’Connor est la nouvelle assistante 
de l’équipe EGE depuis le 9 juin.  
Dans le cadre du BEPA “Visitors Programme”, 
nous accueillons à partir de la mi-juin et pour 
une période de deux mois, Sony Kapoor, le 
directeur du think tank Re-Define. Son travail 
portera sur trois thèmes : le coût de la non-
Europe, la régulation financière et la 
gouvernance économique européenne. 
Le BEPA souhaite la bienvenue à ses nouveaux 
membres. 
Matti Maasikas quitte l’équipe Outreach du 
BEPA à la fin du mois de juin pour devenir le 
Représentant Permanent de l’Estonie auprès de 
l’UE. Nous le remercions pour ses services et lui 
souhaitons une bonne continuation. 
Evénements 
Le 7 juin, le BEPA en coopération avec le 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace a 
organisé le 2e forum annuel sur les relations entre 
l’UE et la Russie. Les débats ont porté sur les 
processus en place – aussi bien au niveau 
national en Europe et en Russie qu’à l'étranger – 
pouvant poser des défis dans les relations des ces 
deux acteurs importants, tant au cours de l’année 
prochaine que pendant la prochaine décennie. 
Des experts européens, russes et américains se 
sont notamment concentré sur le rôle de la 
Russie d’ici 2020, les relations énergétiques entre 
l’UE et la Russie et les priorités transatlantiques. 
Le 14 juin, le BEPA a organisé une conférence 
internationale intitulée “Les produits de base et 
les matières premières: défis et réponses 
politiques”. Le Président Barroso et le Président 
français Sarkozy étaient des intervenants 
principaux. La conférence visait à contribuer aux 
discussions au sein du G-20. D’importantes 
questions ont été abordées telles que les prix sur 
les marchés des produits de base et le meilleur 
m o y e n  d e  g a r a n t i r  l a  s é c u r i t é 
d’approvisionnement ; l’éventualité que les prix 
élevés puissent être bénéfique en termes de 
stimulation de la demande accrue et le 
développement d’alternatives ; et les réponses 
politiques nécessaires apportées par l’UE, le  
G-20, l’OMC et d’autres au niveau international. 
Le vice-Président Tajani, les Commissaires 
Cioloş, Oettinger, Barnier et de Gucht, des 
représentants de haut niveau de gouvernements, 
de l’industrie, du secteur financier, d’associations 
professionnelles ainsi que des leaders d’opinion 
influents de l’Australie, Afrique, Chine, Brésil, 
Russie et des Etats-Unis sont également 
intervenus au cours de cet événement. Vous 
retrouverez les discours des deux Présidents  sur notre site 
internet : http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/expertise/
conferences/raw_materials/index_en.htm 
Le 19 juin, le BEPA a participé à la cérémonie de 
remise du Prix pour l’Economie Globale 2011 
qui a été organisée conjointement par l’Institut 
sur l’Economie Globale de Kiel et la ville de 
Kiel.  
Le 27 juin, le BEPA et les entités fédératives des 
Eglises chrétiennes (COMECE) ont organisé un 
débat sur le thème “L'inclusion des Roms: un 
besoin, un défi et un devoir”. Le séminaire 
voulait identifier la contribution des Eglises – 
notamment de l’Eglise catholique romaine – à la 
stratégie de l’UE pour l’intégration des 
populations Roms et discuter des défis que ce 
projet d’intégration pose (notamment dans le 
domaine de l’éducation). 
Le même jour, le BEPA en coopération avec le 
Centre for European Studies (CES) a organisé 
une table ronde intitulée “A la recherche d'un 
nouveau récit européen” où les auteurs de trois 
études – des experts faisant partie de groupes de 
réflexion formés par le CES pour analyser trois 
problèmes majeurs d’intérêt européen – ont eu 
l’occasion de présenter les résultats de leurs 
analyses. Les études portent sur le recalibrage de 
la relation transatlantique dans le contexte d’un 
monde multipolaire, les relations UE-Russie et 
l’avenir du commerce mondial. 
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Finalement, ce même jour, le BEPA participait à 
un déjeuner avec des représentants de 
laboratoires d’idées se spécialisant sur les 
perspectives financières. Le BEPA a aussi reçu 
une délégation d’assistants parlementaires de 
Membres du Congrès américain qui était en visite 
à Bruxelles. 
Activités à venir 
Le 1er juillet; le BEPA et la DG Recherche et 
Innovation organisent conjointement une 
conférence sur “L'espace Atlantique géopolitique 
et géo-économique: possibilités et défis 
communs” rassemblant des participants de 
l’Afrique, l’Europe et l’Amérique du Nord et du 
Sud. L’objectif principal de cet événement est 
d’identifier les tendances émergentes dans les 
relations entre différents pays et acteurs des deux 
rives de l’Atlantique (aussi bien au nord qu'au 
sud) et d’examiner les implications politiques et 
les pistes futures dans le monde de la recherche 
qui y découlent. 
Le 12 juillet, le BEPA organise en collaboration 
avec une organisation humaniste un colloque sur 
le thème “Jeunesse – éducation – culture” afin 
d’explorer les perspectives d’intégration de la 
jeunesse à la construction de la société 
européenne et de discuter des politiques 
européennes de jeunesse et des instruments et 
objectifs de la Commission à ce sujet. 
Le 14 juillet, le BEPA organise une séance 
informelle de brainstorming rassemblant un petit 
groupe d’experts et de leaders d’opinion 
européens pour un échange de points de vue sur 
“l'état de l'Europe”. La réunion vise à rassembler 
et à bénéficier de l’expertise européenne tant sur 
des sujets d’actualité que des thèmes et des 
priorités qui domineront l’agenda politique de 
l’UE dans les prochains mois. 
